Al-Farabi views the process of intellecting an intelligible, or external object, as a movement from potentiality to actuality. The soul is the material faculty upon which abstracted forms are imprinted, and the potential intellect is the rational faculty. As the potential intellect intellects an intelligible and imprints it upon the material faculty, the material faculty becomes the actual intellect. This is a crucial moment in Al-Farabi’s philosophy, because he thereafter notes a difference in nature between the actual intelligible and the potential intelligible. That is to say that there is a change in constitution of the intelligible itself as it moves from the external world to the actual intellect (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Al-Farabi). If taken seriously, this seems to infer the impossibility of objective truth. And if so, one could raise the question of whether knowledge can be affirmed without the requirement of truth or objectivity.
We first need to work out whether this change in constitution is a subtraction or addition of attributes. If it is a subtraction, then either there would be a somewhat realistic yet highly deficient conception of the object, or there would be another faculty which combines previous conceptions with the current one in order to make up for the deficiency. If it is an addition, the result would be a particular perspective; and because the faculty making the addition would be dependent on previous experiences, there would be as many perspectives as individuals differing in their experiences. It seems, however, that because a deficient conception will always remain deficient, either option argued for will nevertheless result in a particular perspective. Furthermore, it will be a perspective which in every case is incapable of bridging the gap between the subject and the object.
Let’s consider the notion of perspective, and whether it may be useful in a determination of knowledge. At first glance, it may seem that an affirmation of perspective rather than objectivity would result in puzzlement and indifference – that is, when thousands of perspectives interact independently within a social sphere. But for Nietzsche, it is the opposite: the very recognition of multiple perspectives allows for the ability to move swiftly between them “so that one knows how to make precisely the difference in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge” (SEoP, Nietzsche).
Next, it seems important to consider the implications of accepting the notion of an irreconcilable distance between me and the world. For Albert Camus, it is in the encounter between my desire to bridge the gap and my inability to do so that arises a feeling of absurdity. According to Camus, our confrontation with absurdity can lead us down two paths. The first path is suicide, being either actual self-annihilation or the escape into a dogmatic or otherwise untenable conception of the world. The second path is “the repudiation of suicide and the acceptance of the desperate encounter between human inquiry and the silence of the universe” (SEoP, Camus).
What would happen if we brought these views together? The result may be a shift in our conception of knowledge: knowledge would flow unrelentingly, and each statement would renounce its inclination towards total authority while simultaneously affirming itself as absurd. This would allow for a positive affirmation of ambiguity, an acceptance of difference in perspective, and a skillful maneuvering within the flow of knowledge without becoming caught within the bounds of the absolute.
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