Many would agree that being is characterized by a gradual intensification. That is to say that beings tend towards their own “self-perfection” on the path leading from birth until death. What this “perfection” entails seems context dependent, and it is the movement itself which I shall be concerned with. Where thinkers disagree is what exactly accounts for this movement. For Avicenna, it is the prior essence of a being that unifies all predicates and facilitates its movement. Conversely, existentialist thinkers argue that it is the existence of a being and the freedom inherent in that existence which determines its essence. Due to the contradictory nature of both views, it seems necessary to examine both further.
For Avicenna, that which differentiates an individual being within a species is established prior to that being’s existence. This is because a contingent being cannot necessitate its own existence, and so the cause of its being must be external to it. That cause is the end or essence of that being, and once the cause is brought into motion, the beings essence is united with its existence. Therefore, essence precedes existence, and every other cause is subordinated to the cause which is the being’s end. The result is a “hierarchy of being”, where the attainment of all attributes and differences, whether they contribute to the beings self-perfection or not, are an attempt to employ means to establish this pre-determined end. The fact that attributes change over time need not undermine the unity of a being’s essence, since change can be accounted for by the imaginative faculty, which combines and separates objects of perception to create unique conceptual frameworks which in turn necessitate the changes of the body’s movement over time. These unique and changing attributes are swallowed up by the unchanging and necessary attributes which constitute a being’s essence.
Existentialists could reply by arguing firstly that Avicenna seems to be confusing speciation with individuation. It is true that all individuals of a species have certain attributes necessary for their existence. However, there is no discernible necessary feature which differentiates one individual from another. Until such a feature is found, we should regard an individual’s essence as determined by its existence. Any proposal that such a feature has been found, for example through scientific means, is basing such a judgement on a process of inference, where the process itself is likely in need of justification.
Secondly, it seems that Avicenna shows a weakness in the concept he brings forth: if the freedom of the imaginative faculty makes it possible for change in a being determined by essence, what prevents one from arguing that it is this very freedom which facilitates essence altogether? After all, I have already argued that there are no necessary attributes – there seem to be only accidents – which can be observed in an individual considered separate from the species to which it belongs. Therefore, perhaps an existentialist could proceed to suggest a causal link between essence and existence, a sort of circular relation where each propels the other forth.
I understand that Avicenna could object to this point by arguing that even if there is a circular relation between existence and essence, it still leaves the question open as to what came first. If existence causes existence, the result must be a completely undifferentiated being.
Avicenna has some merit in this point. It does indeed seem inevitable that there is something separate that brings being into existence. However, why need this be the determinate and necessary essence of a being? As perhaps Gilles Deleuze would argue, the very thing which brings a being into existence could take on a “Rhizomatic structure”, being by its very nature indeterminate. This would result in an entity which is accidental instead of necessary, one which unfolds through time, constantly forming new arrangements, not predetermined by a “hierarchy of being” but rather necessitated and structured by difference itself.
To conclude, whether we side with essentialism or existentialism, it seems evident that once we are brought into existence, there is a certain freedom which allows us to influence our essence. There seems to exist no proof for any necessary attributes which constitute a being’s essence, and so I suggest that we could side with either mode of thought on the basis of its implications.
El-Bizri, Nader. Avicenna and Essentialism. Review of metaphysics. 2001.
El-Bizri, Nader. The Phenomenological Quest Between Avicenna and Heidegger. 2000.
McGinnis & Reisman. Avicenna: The Salvation, Metaphysics. 2007.
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